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Abstract
In a collaborative setting, banks have an additional way to deal with asymmet-
ric information between themselves and their borrowers: by pooling information.
We explore the extent to which lead arrangers in the project finance syndicated
lending market strategically choose their new partners in order to pool inform-
ation, thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric information between
themselves and their borrowers. We find that information pooling explains with
whom banks collaborate, why they reach further into their network to find new
partners and why they go outside their existing network if the need to pool in-
formation is high enough.
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Lending is the business of dealing with asymmetric information, sometimes through
contractual arrangements, often through monitoring, but frequently also in other ways
that involve pooling information, over time, or from different sources. When little is
known about a borrower, lenders may rely on relationship lending. Building a rela-
tionship with its borrower can be a powerful way for a financial intermediary to deal
with asymmetric information. As a result, an extant body of literature has focused
on studying the relationships between lenders and borrowers (e.g. Berlin and Mester,
1998; Bharath et al., 2011; Boot, 2000; Elsas, 2005; Ongena and Smith, 2001; Cantillo
and Wright, 2000; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). In order to be able to realize the gains
(both for lender and borrower) from relationship lending, the lender has to be able to
lock in the borrower, at least to some extent. But what happens when the borrower
is a project company, where repeated lending is by no means obvious, lock in is very
difficult and where there is no borrowing history, credit ratings or credit register that
the lender can use? In that case, the lender is exposed to large information asymmetry
(adverse selection) problems. These problems may become even more sever when
lending takes place not through one lender, but through a syndicate, since the collab-
orative intentions of lenders in a syndicate are largely unobservable (Leland and Pyle,
1977; Holmstrom, 1982; Ball, Bushman and Vasvari, 2008; Tykvova, 2007; Sufi, 2007).
We investigate how lenders cope with their need to reduce information asymmetry vis-
a`-vis their borrower, and their need to reduce moral hazard among syndicate members
through the composition of project finance loan syndicates. Information asymmetry in
the project finance loan market prevails because loans are extended to project com-
panies established to undertake a single, newly to be established project. As a result,
lenders are unable to establish a relationship with the project company beyond the
life of the project. However, the syndicate’s lead arrangers -informed lenders respons-
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ible for screening, monitoring, and setting up the loan terms- build up informational
capital by gaining project-specific, tacit information and know-how when arranging
projects. Informational capital is important because arranging project finance loans
require extensive knowledge (Gatti, 2013). In turn, informational capital can be used
when setting up future project finance loans, thereby reducing information asymmetry
problems. Ideally, lenders would like to arrange project finance loans with lenders that
complement their own informational capital and at the same time carry low moral haz-
ard.
A large body of literature focuses on the moral hazard stemming from status asym-
metry between lead arrangers and participant lenders in loan syndicates (e.g. Simons,
1993; Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993; Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Jones, Land
and Nigro, 2005; Sufi, 2007; Ball, Bushman and Vasvari, 2008; Ivashina, 2009; Gadanecz,
Kara and Molyneux, 2012; Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007; Dennis and Mullin-
eaux, 2000). What this literature largely fails to address is how lead arrangers form
loan syndicates such that the lack of borrower information is mitigated while potential
moral hazard problems among lead arrangers are reduced. Song (2004) studies how
lead banks form a syndicate with the purpose of increasing their joint informational
capital but disregards the moral hazard problems arising among the lead banks in the
syndicate. We argue that an important way lead arrangers can mitigate moral hazard
problems is by arranging loans with lead arrangers in their stock of lender relation-
ships, i.e. those they know through previous syndicates. However, the extent to which
their joint information capital is complementary is expected to be lower than the joint
informational capital from lead arrangers that have not arranged loans together in the
past. It is the tradeoff between these two considerations that determines how lead
arrangers make strategic decisions about syndication.
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Studying the lead arranger composition of project finance loan syndicates allows us to
delve deeper in a key decision process in financial intermediation, and to contribute to
the extant literature on financial intermediation in four different ways. First and fore-
most, we contribute to the larger literature that investigates the impact of borrower
information asymmetries on lending decisions and syndicate structure. Second, we
study how lenders build and maintain relationships with each other. While most re-
search in syndicated lending uses the syndicate as its unit of analysis, we follow Cham-
pagne and Kryzanowski (2007) and Song (2004) and take a network view to explain the
structure of syndicates. Each of us takes a different approach to the network of syndic-
ates. In Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007) lender pairs are the key unit of analysis.
Song (2004) instead focuses on the type of bank -commercial or investment- joining the
syndicate as a lead arranger. We contend that lenders follow a portfolio perspective
to loan syndication and decide whether to form new lender relationships or reinforce
existing ones based on the stock of lender relationships they already have. This allows
us not only to study lender relationships as a potential source of moral hazard, but it
also allows us to understand how lenders manage their relationships. Third, we study
the importance of asymmetric information in shaping relationships in a collaborative
setting, with varying degrees of asymmetric information. With our network approach
to the portfolio of relationships each lender in the syndicated loan market maintains,
we can observe two things: which lenders collaborate, and how distant are those who
do not collaborate. These two elements are key in studying asymmetric information in
a setting where the collaborative intentions of lenders are largely unobservable (Leland
and Pyle, 1977; Holmstrom, 1982; Ball, Bushman and Vasvari, 2008). Lenders obtain in-
formation directly from other lenders with whom they have previously collaborated.
In addition, they can obtain information about other lenders as well through the net-
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work they have built so far. As a simple example, consider two lenders that have never
cooperated in a syndicate together, but have both cooperated with a third lender. The
existence of such a common (past) partner can help mitigate asymmetric information
concerns. Fourth, we study project finance loan syndicates, where lenders give out
loans that are both sizable and often geared towards rather risky projects (Kleimeier
and Megginson, 2000; Esty and Megginson, 2003; Esty, 2004; Gatti, 2013). Banks that
engage in project finance through syndicated lending dip their toes into a pool that
has expanded considerably both geographically and number wise in the last ten years
(Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000; Esty and Megginson, 2003; Esty, 2004; Gatti, 2013).
Not surprisingly, they join together in loan syndicates to pool funding and share loan
management-related tasks and costs. By pooling resources, financial institutions par-
ticipating in project finance loan syndicates also pool knowledge, and possibly build
relationships with partner institutions, thus exploiting yet another way of overcoming
asymmetric information in lending (Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007; Holmstrom,
1982). Therefore, studying project finance loan syndicates allows us to study the rela-
tionships among lenders in a market where information about the borrower is difficult
to come across and lender-borrower relationships are difficult -if not impossible- to
build. In markets like this, loan syndicates allow lenders to actively collaborate and
exchange know-how when lending to borrowers from whom little is known.
We find that that lead arrangers indeed reach out to new partners with whom there are
no network connections when lending to firms with -to them- high degrees of asym-
metric information. Lending to those firms also means lead arrangers are willing to
reach out further into their network to syndicate with new partners. Key to lead ar-
rangers’ decision to pool information with new partners is the arrangement of a pro-
ject finance loan in sectors that are beyond their current area of expertise. Our findings
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suggests that lead arrangers consider that the potential moral hazard that comes from
working with new partners takes a back seat to the benefits they derive from pooling
information in this manner. Importantly, our results hold across sample periods and
are independent of the degree to which banks are already active as lead arrangers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we describe import-
ant institutional details about syndicated lending and the project finance loan market.
Section 2 develops our set of testable hypotheses. The econometric model is presented
and discussed in Section 3. Section 4 explains the data, dependent and independent
variables used to test our hypotheses, and provides summary statistics. Our analyses
and results appear in Section 5, and the robustness tests appear in Section 6. We
conclude with a brief discussion of our findings and their implications in Section 7.
1 Background on Project Finance Lending
We investigate syndicate formation in the context of project finance lending. We focus
on project finance loans rather than syndicated lending as a whole for several reas-
ons. First, informational capital is particularly important in project finance because of
the contractual nature of project finance. Second, because of the transactional nature
of project finance lending, banks need to rely on informational capital. Third, moral
hazard within syndicates can have severe consequences in project finance because pro-
jects are highly levered with non-recourse debt. Before outlining our hypotheses, we
need to define project finance in more detail and thereby substantiate our reasons for
selecting project finance loan syndicates as the focus of our analysis.
In project finance one or more parent companies, called the sponsors, set up an in-
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dependent project company in order to realize a new investment in a single-purpose,
limited-life capital asset. This project company is both legally and financially inde-
pendent from the sponsors. As a legally independence entity, the project company is
the owner of the asset and is responsible for its realization, financing and operation.
The financing of the new investment relies heavily on bank loans with debt-to-capital
ratios of 75% for the average project company (Esty, Chavich and Sesia, 2014). Due to
the financial independence of the project company, this debt is non-recourse. Banks
cannot rely on the sponsors but must look only towards the project’s cash flows for
repayment.
While the use of project finance can be traced back to the Roman Empire, its first mod-
ern uses involved the development of US railroads in the 19th century and the de-
velopment of oil fields in the US and North Sea in the 1930s and 1970s (Gatti, 2013;
Kleimeier and Megginson, 2000). Since then, project finance has spread around the
globe and been applied in various industries including the public sector. Private sec-
tor sponsors have typically applied project finance for asset-rich investments in the
industrial, oil and gas or mining sectors. In the 1990s, the private and public sectors
started cooperating to realize infrastructure projects in the transportation, power and
telecommunication sectors (Esty, Chavich and Sesia, 2014). During our sample period
from 1987 to 2014, project companies raised $2,512 bn in project finance loans world-
wide, accounting for 4.21% of the global syndicated loan market. 39.5% of these loans
financed infrastructure projects followed by projects in the manufacturing (15.8%) and
mining sectors (10.4%) (see Table 1).
In order to finance a new project without established cash flows with a highly levered
capital structure that is dominated by non-recourse debt, risk management of the pro-
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Table 1: Project finance around the world
Total Loan Volume
Sector Number ofProjects
USD
Billions
Market
Share
Infrastructure 2,125 993.4 39.5%
Manufacturing 802 395.9 15.8%
Mining 493 261.7 10.4%
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 942 256.7 10.2%
Construction 651 248.0 9.9%
Other services 469 130.4 5.2%
Finance, insurance & real estate 428 111.9 4.4%
Public administration 134 89.6 3.6%
Retail trade 53 15.1 0.6%
Wholesale trade 45 10.2 0.4%
Total 6,142 2,512.0 100%
Min Mean Max St.Dev.
Loan size (USD Millions) 0.04 170.54 72,728.56 0.00
Number of lead arrangers 1.00 2.11 36.00 2.39
Maturity (years) 0.17 7.78 42.72 0.20
Total loans 6,142
Fraction of loans with > 1 lead arranger 39.29
Note: The infrastructure sector covers transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary ser-
vices. Sample period: 1987 to 2014. Source: DealScan.
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ject is essential. Project finance thus relies on a large set of contractual agreements that
involves construction companies, suppliers, customers, and host governments. The
aim is to allocate each risk to the party that is best able control and manage it. For
example, the construction company is typically offered a fixed-price turnkey contract
so that it bears the risk of construction delay and cost overruns. Suppliers and cus-
tomers enter long-term, fixed-price supply and offtake contracts, respectively. Ideally,
these supply and offtake contracts are aligned so that price and volume risk is hedged.
The exact nature of these contracts depends on the project’s industry. Pipeline projects
typically employ throughput agreements that enforce a minimum usage level on the
customer while take-or-pay contracts are common in other industries. However, for
projects that sell to a large number of customers, for example toll roads, such contracts
are infeasible. It is common for a project to rely on more than 40 contracts involving as
many as 15 different parties. Large projects can, however, be far more complex as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, financed in 2002 for $3.6 bn, illustrates. Its con-
tractual structure consisted of 200 documents with 17,000 signatures from 78 parties
(Esty, Chavich and Sesia, 2014).
The loan syndicate becomes involved in the project after the sponsors have set up the
project company and arranged the contractual structure. The key roles in the syndicate
are those of lead arranger and participant. During the initial phase of the financial
negotiations, the lead arrangers assess the credit quality of the project including the
financial projections and contractual structure and negotiate the loan terms. Next, the
arrangers invite other banks to participate in the funding of the loan. After financial
closure, the arrangers monitor the project and renegotiate on behalf of the syndicate in
case of financial distress (Esty and Megginson, 2003).
Given the high-leverage and non-recourse nature of project finance, the screening and
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monitoring efforts of the lead arrangers are critical - even more so than in standard
syndicated lending. Lead arrangers need to understand the industry specifics of the
project in order to properly assess the project’s financial projections and contractual
structure. In project finance lending, arrangers thus need informational capital that
encompasses not only the financial but also the operational aspects of the project.
Project finance loans are extended to project companies established to undertake a
single, newly to be established project. Thus, lead arrangers cannot establish a re-
lationship with the project company beyond the life of the project and have to rely
on informational capital. Even if lead arrangers have an existing lending relationship
with the sponsors of the project company, this is of little use as the project company
is both legally and financially independent from the sponsors. Thus, project finance
loans are in essence transaction loans in contrast to general syndicated loans that have
characteristics from both relationship and transaction loans (Dennis and Mullineaux,
2000). Instead of gaining tacit information and know-how about the borrower through
a lending relationship, lead arrangers need to obtain tacit information and know-how
about the project-specific transaction.
2 Hypotheses
Do arrangers reinforce their connections with other lead arrangers or create new ones
every time they arrange loans? Syndicated lending is typically assumed to be a market
of repeated collaborations where past lender collaborations determine their future col-
laborations when syndicating loans (Sufi, 2007; Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007;
Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). In this case, we should see repeated collaborations among
lead arrangers. Of all lead arranger collaborations formed between 1987 and 2014,
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32% include new co-arranger partners. This means lead arrangers do not always rely
on their past lending relations to syndicate current or future deals. Why do lead ar-
rangers tend to collaborate with new partners to such a large extent? We answer this
question by analyzing the information pooling needs of lead arrangers in a network
setting.
2.1 Information Pooling Needs
Lead arrangers build information capital by evaluating projects, setting up the com-
plex series of contractual and financial arrangements project finance loans require, and
monitoring the progress of the project (Brealey, Cooper and Habib, 1996; Gatti et al.,
2013). In part, this process is straightforward: project finance lending, being a trans-
action market, allows lead arrangers to specialize and develop competences (Das and
Nanda, 1999). These competences are important because project finance loans often
require extensive knowledge of the industry the project operates in (Gatti et al., 2013).
Hence, it is in the interest of banks to know a sector well and become familiar with
the legal, institutional and managerial requirements that projects in certain industries
demand. This information and experience can be leveraged when financing similar
projects or projects within the same industry.
The inability to leverage existing informational capital when lending to unfamiliar in-
dustries prompts lead arrangers to pool information with other lead arrangers. As a
result of this information pooling, each lead arranger has a portfolio of lead arranger
collaborations. Managing this portfolio is key to the overall success of a bank on the
project finance syndicated lending market. The right portfolio of collaborations pools
as much information as possible and necessary.
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The benefits of information pooling need to be balanced against its costs, arising
from moral hazard problems associated with information production (Pichler and
Wilhelm, 2001) and costly monitoring (Diamond, 1984). Moral hazard is reduced
when lead arrangers work with banks with whom they have previously partnered
(Holmstrom, 1982; Tykvova, 2007).Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007), for instance,
show that two banks are more likely to join a syndicate in the future when they
have already collaborated in the previous five years. However, from an information
generation perspective, the marginal information value of prior partners decreases.
Gulati (1995) argues that as the number of collaborations between two firms increases,
the additional information to be exchanged between them decreases. Therefore when
a lead arranger’s information pooling needs increase, collaborating with new partners
becomes more attractive. This brings us to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Information Pooling Needs). Banks collaborate with new partner banks
when information pooling needs are high.
2.2 Information Pooling Efforts
From a network perspective, a partner bank can take three distinct shapes. First, it can
be a bank that is already part of the bank’s portfolio of collaborations. Second, it can
be a bank that is a new partner, but connected to the focal bank through the project
finance syndication network. Third, it can be a new partner with whom there are no
network connections.
Co-arranging with a new partner exposes the lead arranger to higher moral hazard,
the more distant the new partner is in the network. Banks can try to lower the risk as-
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sociated with collaborating with more distant partners by obtaining information about
potential new partners from their portfolio of collaborations. Referrals about new part-
ners can travel through the network until they reach the lead arranger through its port-
folio of collaborations (Granovetter, 1983; Brass et al., 2004). The quality of the referrals
deteriorates as they travel longer distances through the network. In this respect, the
quality of the referral mimics the quality of the message in the so-called telephone
game.1
There is, however, also an upside to connecting to more distant new partners. The
more closely connected banks are in the project finance lending network, the more
complementary the informational capital is. As a result, reaching out further into the
network is expected to yield benefits when banks face high information pooling needs,
possibly offsetting the moral hazard concerns. As a result, our second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2 (Information Pooling Efforts). Banks collaborate with more distant new
partner banks when information pooling needs are high.
3 The Econometric Model
Our overall objective is to ascertain what determines a bank’s decision to pool inform-
ation through new syndications. Formally testing our two hypotheses requires the use
of two related, but slightly different approaches. The first approach results in Model 1,
with which we assess the extent to which banks pool information by collaborating with
1 In the telephone game, one person whispers a message into the ear of the next person through a line
of people until the last player announces the message to the entire group. Although the objective is to
pass around the message without it becoming distorted errors typically accumulate in the retellings.
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new partner banks. The second approach results in Model 2, with which we assess how
far banks are willing to go to find new partner banks in order to pool information.
3.1 Model 1: information pooling needs
Before we find out the lengths (of a network) banks are willing to go to collaborate
with new partners in order to pool information, we need to establish whether they
use this strategy in the first place. If the channel we are interested in exists, then new
partnerships ‘arrive’ as banks need to pool information. Our main variable of interest
is the Number of New Collaborations, which is a count variable. Hence, we use a
Poisson regression, and our Model 1 is as follows:
Number of New Collaborations =α+
β1Information Pooling Needsbank+
β2Information Pooling Needsportfolio+
β3Controls + e
(1)
The information pooling needs of a bank increase when it starts lending to new indus-
tries, reflected in a higher value for Information Pooling Needsbank. However, when
the existing portfolio of collaborations of the focal bank already meets that inform-
ation pooling need, the bank can rely on this complementary expertise and will be
prone to collaborate with fewer, new syndicate partners. We measure the difference
between this complementary expertise and the bank’s own informational capital with
Information Pooling Needsportfolio, where a higher value indicates a larger comple-
mentarity. As a result, we expect β1 to be positive and β2 to be negative. We explain
the exact measurement of the two explanatory variables in detail in Section 4.4.1. In
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addition, we control for the number of project finance loans the bank is responsible for
arranging and include bank fixed effects.
3.2 Model 2: information pooling efforts
Model 2 relates the decision of a bank to collaborate with new partners with the extent
to which it is willing to search for these new partners. To what lengths (quite literally)
is a bank willing to go into the project finance lending network to find new partners?
Of course, the true effort is a latent variable. We approximate it using the syndicated
lending network features, as before. For this purpose, we measure each bank’s New
Syndicate Partner Distance. Specifically, we measure the distance as the number of
banks the lead arranger has to go through to reach the new partner, scaled by the
farthest distance between banks in the network. Hence, the minimum value for this
measure is zero, and its maximum is 1, which is also the value it takes if the new
partner is not connected in any way to the bank. The result is Model 2, which we can
estimate use a Tobit specification:
New Syndicate Partner Distance =α+
β1Information Pooling Needsbank+
β2Information Pooling Needsportfolio+
β3Controls + e
(2)
Ceteris paribus, we expect a lead arranger to search more and therefore ‘travel’ a longer
distance when searching for information as its information pooling needs increase.
Therefore, the set of independent variables in equation (2) is the same as in equation
(1). We expect β1 to be positive and β2 to be negative.
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4 Data
Our sample of lead arrangers active in project finance lending comes from the Loan Pri-
cing Corporation’s DealScan database (henceforth DealScan), the preferred database
for studying loan syndications.2 We use all project finance loans reported in DealS-
can between 1987 and 2014 to create the syndicate portfolios of lead arrangers active
in project finance lending. We exclude all deals that (a) are not syndicated, (b) do not
report any lead arrangers, (c) were canceled, (d) are bonds or floating-rate notes. In
order to have a comprehensive understanding of new and old lead arrangers partners
in the project finance lending market, we include all project finance deals regardless of
country of issuance or size. Applying these filters yield 6,142 transactions accounting
for 4.2% of all syndicated loans issued between 1987 and 2014.
4.1 The network structure of project finance lending
Project finance loans are typically syndicated with not only multiple participants but
also multiple lead arrangers. Between 1987 and 2014, 39% of all 6,142 project finance
loans were arranged by multiple banks as Table 1 shows. While on average the number
of lead arrangers is a moderate 2.11, some projects can have a much more substantial
number of lead arrangers. Among the largest projects are the Qatargas II project (Qatar,
2005) with 36 lead arrangers and the Marafiq Independent Water & Power Plant (Saudi
Arabia, 2007) with 32 lead arrangers. Over time, as lead arrangers syndicate more and
more project finance loans, they work with various co-lead arrangers and thereby build
2 See for example Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); Esty and Megginson (2003); Champagne and Kryz-
anowski (2007); Francois and Missonier-Piera (2007); Sufi (2007); Bharath et al. (2011); Cai, Saunders
and Steffen (2011); Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011); Gadanecz, Kara and Molyneux (2012);
Hainz and Kleimeier (2012).
16
a portfolio of collaborations.
Figure 1 illustrates how banks form their collaborative portfolios over time. Panel (a)
provides a simple picture of the project finance loan market in which four loans are
syndicated. Banks A to E act as lead arrangers and jointly or individually arrange
these project finance loans. For example, banks A and B collaborate to jointly arrange
loan 1 while bank E individually arranges loan 4.
Figure 1: From loans to networks: a visualization of the project finance market
Loan 1 Loan 2 Loan 3 Loan 4
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E
(a) Project finance syndicated loan market
Bank B Bank C
Bank D
Bank A Bank A Bank C
Bank B
Bank A Bank B
Bank C
Bank A
Bank D Bank E
(b) Collaboration portfolios of banks A through E
Bank A Bank C
Bank D
Bank E
Bank B
(c) Project finance syndication
network
Panel (b) illustrates the collaborations among banks A to E. Each focal bank has built
up its own portfolio of collaborations. For example, focal bank A has the largest col-
laboration portfolio as it jointly arranges loan 1 with bank B, loan 2 with bank B and
C and loan 3 with bank D. In contrast, focal bank D’s portfolio of collaborations only
consists of bank A with whom it arranges loan 3. Focal bank E has no collaborators as
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it arranges loan 4 individually.
While Panel (b) shows each bank’s collaboration portfolio, Panel (c) models the project
finance market as a whole and shows the syndication network that results from each
bank’s collaborations. Banks A, B, C, and D are linked within the syndication network
either directly or indirectly. Bank D is directly linked to bank A due to its collaboration
in loan 3. Bank D is also indirectly linked to bank B and C as bank A co-arranges loans 1
and 2 with both of these banks. Thus the distance between bank D and B in the network
is 2 as they can reach each other in two steps, e.g. from D to A to B or vice versa. Now
consider the distance between banks D and C: the shortest distance between them is 2
as they are connected via A but they are also connected more indirectly via A and C
with a distance of 3.
For our later empirical analyses regarding information pooling, we will start by look-
ing at all project finance loans that a given bank arranges as shown in Panel (a) in
Figure 1. We classify these projects by their respective industry. This allows us to
measure the industry distribution of a bank’s project finance loan portfolio and derive
an industry specialization measure which serves as a proxy for the informational cap-
ital of the focal bank. Due to the extensive contractual structure of project finance, we
consider the industry of the project to be the key determinant of the project-specific
knowledge that the arranger needs to acquire in order to properly screen and monitor
the project.
Next we will contrast the informational capital of the focal bank with that of the banks
in its portfolio of collaborations as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 1. We contend that if
the informational capital differs substantially between a given bank and its collabora-
tion portfolio, then the bank can extend its informational capital by reaching out to its
collaborators without exposing itself to moral hazard.
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In contrast, if the informational capital of the focal bank coincides with that of its part-
ners, then the bank can only extend its informational capital by reaching out to distant
or even completely new partners, such as bank E in Figure 1. This exposes the bank to
moral hazard which we believe to increase with the distance between the focal bank
and a new partner in the network (see panel (c) of Figure 1).
Thus, we conduct our analyses bank’s collaboration portfolio perspective on the syn-
dication network.
4.2 Sample of lead arranger collaboration portfolios
Our analysis takes place at the portfolio level of each lead arranger. Estimating a lead
arranger’s determinants for co-arranging project finance loans with new lead arranger
partners requires data for each lead arranger and each arranger’s set of unique collab-
orations. To distinguish between new and recurrent collaborations, we follow Baum,
Shipilov and Rowley (2003); Baum et al. (2005); Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007),
and Godlewski, Sanditov and Burger-Helmchen (2012) and label each collaboration
using a five-year history starting in 1992 and ending in 2014. Thus, a lead arranger
in 1992 arranging a syndicated project finance loan with another lead arranger it has
already worked with in the period between 1987 and 1992 is assumed to not be start-
ing a new network connection in doing so. If the same two lead arrangers have not
worked together in that period, or ever before, then it is considered to be a new net-
work connection.
We used a five-year history for two particular reasons. First, syndicate ties through
co-arrangement are the strongest during the first years of a project finance loan. The
first years of the project are the riskiest demanding more due diligence and monitoring
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from the project’s lead arrangers (Baum et al., 2005). Second, using a five-year history
permit us to gauge more accurately and reliably the strength of the ties among lead
arrangers by incorporating information on repeated collaborations over a number of
years. We refer to these sets of lead arranger collaborations as lead arranger collabora-
tion portfolios.
In this way, our sample of 1,109 unique lead arrangers in principle could contain a
total of 25,507 possible lead arranger portfolios. Granted, not every lead arranger in
our sample arranges loans every single year and not every lead arranger collaborates
with others. Filtering for active lead arrangers and co-arrangement in two consecutive
years leaves us with a total of 1,677 lead arranger collaboration portfolios.
4.3 Dependent Variables
4.3.1 Number of New Collaborations
In order to identify which of the lead arrangers in a portfolio of collaborations are new
as opposed to recurrent, we compare how the set of new and recurrent lead arranger
partners in the portfolio changes from one year to the next. To illustrate, consider
once again the example in Figure 1. Bank A in Figure 1 has a lead arranger portfolio
consisting of three different banks, Bank B, Bank C, and Bank D. If in the next time
year, Bank A still works (or has worked in the past 5 years) with those banks and starts
working with Bank E, the connection to the latter is its only new collaboration.
Table 3 contains an overview of the number of new syndicate partners the banks in our
sample of project finance loan syndicates form. In our sample of 1,677 lead arrangers
the average lead arrangers seeks out almost eight new lead arranger partners and in
some instances, it may collaborate with up to 46 new partners.
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4.3.2 New Partner Distance
In order to identify the lengths to which a lead arranger is willing to go to find a new
lead arranger partner, we compare the average number of bank relationships (nodes
in the network) the new partner is removed from the lead arranger to the maximum
distance that same lead arranger can travel to reach the ends of the network. Of course,
some banks - such as bank E in Figure 1 - cannot be reached that way. Therefore, we
normalize the total travel distance and let it range between close to zero and one, where
the value of one corresponds to the distance to a bank like Bank E in Figure 1.
The formula below shows how the variable new partner distance is calculated:
New Partner Distance =
{ N
∑
i=1
Distancei
Maximum Distance + 1
× 1+ M
}
× 1
N+M
(3)
where Distancei is the degrees of separation3 between the lead arranger and the new lead
arranger partner i in time t-1; Maximum Distance is the maximum degree of separa-
tion between the lead arranger and any other bank within the network; 1 is an indicator
variable equal to one when the lead arranger joins a syndicate with new lead arranger
partners within the network and zero otherwise; and M is the count of new lead ar-
ranger partners that such as bank E in Figure 1 cannot be reached. Hence, all new
partners that are unreachable to the lead arranger are assigned a distance equal to one.
And, M is the count of all new partners that can be reached by the lead arranger.
In Table 3, we can see that the average lead arranger in our sample travels relatively
large distances when collaborating with new lead arranger partners. On average, new
lead arranger partners are at a distance of 0.837 from the lead arranger prior to collab-
orating, fairly close to the maximum distance of one. Furthermore, with a minimum
3 See Milgram (1967)
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distance equal to 0.453, lead arrangers go at least half-way through their networks to
search for new lead arranger partners.
4.4 Independent Variables
4.4.1 Information Pooling Needs
A lead arranger’s need for information pooling depends on two things: the inform-
ation capital it has amassed itself, and the information capital to which it has access
through its existing collaboration portfolio.
A lead arranger may need to pool information with a new lead arranger partner when
the information capital it has built up through previous loans is not sufficient. An
example of such a case is when a lead arranger intends to fund a project in an industry
it has no prior experience with. That brings us to our first information pooling need
measure:
Information pooling needsLead arranger =
∑
j
∣∣∣Number PF Loansτ,j −Number PF Loansτ−1,j∣∣∣
Number PF Loansτ−1 to τ
,
(4)
where Number PF Loans is the count of project finance loans arranged by a lead ar-
ranger. The subscript j refers to each of the ten different industry classifications a pro-
ject can be classified into, and τ refers to the five-year history of each lead arranger’s
lending activity. Hence, equation (4) measures the proportion of loans to new indus-
tries a lead arranger has taken on. The lower this measure, the higher the information
pooling needs of this lead arranger.
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Table 3 shows that the average lead arranger is indeed rather specialized and thereby
has relatively high information pooling needs resulting in an average score of 17.2%
albeit with maximum values up to by 100%. Figure 2(a) shows the underlying distri-
bution and confirms that most lead arrangers’ information pooling needs, based on
their own portfolio of syndicated project finance loans, are indeed fairly high.
Of course, a lead arranger’s information pooling needs also depend on the comple-
mentary experience and knowledge with those that are already part of its portfolio of
collaborations. In order to measure this complementarity between the lead arranger
and its portfolio of collaborations, we measure how different the lead arranger’s lend-
ing portfolio is with respect to its lead arranger partners. Equation (5) shows how this
variable is calculated:
Information pooling needsportfolio =
∑
j
∣∣∣Number PF LoansLead arrangerτ−1,j −Number PF LoansPortfolioτ−1,j ∣∣∣
Number PF LoansLead arrangerτ−1 + Number PF Loans
Portfolio
τ−1
,
(5)
where Number PF LoansLead arrangerτ−1,j refers to the number of project finance loans in
industry j arranged by the lead arranger in the previous five-year period and Number
PF LoansBankτ−1,j refers to the number of project finance loans in industry j arranged by
the lead arranger’s portfolio of collaborations over the same time.
Table 3 shows that over the sample period from 1992 and 2014, the average lead ar-
ranger has a lending portfolio that is 68.3% complementary to that of its lead arranger
collaboration portfolio. Figure 2(b) shows us the underlying distribution and demon-
strates that whereas less than 1% of all lead arranger collaboration portfolios is not
complementary at all (resulting in a score equal to zero), approximately 12% of all col-
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laboration portfolios is perfectly complementary (resulting in a score equal to one).
Figure 2: Distribution of our two key independent variables: Information pooling
needslead arranger and Information pooling needsportfolio
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4.5 Controlling for the scale of operations
More active lead arrangers are likely to collaborate with more lead arranger partners,
including new partners. Therefore, we account for how active lead arrangers are in a
given year, by including as a control the count of project finance loans arranged by a
lead arranger.4 Table 3 shows that the average lead arranger in our sample takes on
between one and 68 project finance loans in any given year between 1992 and 2014. But
given that project finance loans are capital-intensive and lengthy loans, it is no surprise
that the average lead arranger only manages about five new project finance loans each
year.
4 Results remain robust when accounting for the U.S. dollar value of loans arranged instead of the count
of project finance loans.
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Table 2: Main variable definitions
Information Pooling
New Lead Arranger
Partners This is the number of syndicate partners in a lead arranger’s collaboration portfolioidentified as new. Partners are categorized as new when they have not co-arranged
any project finance loans with the focal bank in the previous five years.
New Lead Arranger
Partner Distance This is the average distance a bank is willing to search in order to find new partners. Itis calculated as follows:
New Lead Arranger Partner Distance =
{ N
∑
i=1
Distancei
Maximum Distance + 1
× 1 + M
}
×
1
N+M
where Distancei is the degrees of separation between the focal bank and the new partner
bank i in time t-1; Maximum Distance is the maximum degree of separation between
the focal bank and any other bank within its extended network; 1 is an indicator vari-
able equal to one when the focal bank partners with new banks within its extended
network and zero otherwise; and M is the count of new partners from other bank
clusters beyond the focal bank’s extended network.
Proportion of
Unreachable New Lead
Arranger Partners
This is the ratio of the count of unreachable new syndicate partners to the count of all
new syndicate partners. Unreachable new syndicate partners do not have any “com-
mon banks” with the focal bank.
Unreachable New
Lead Arranger
Partners (Dummy)
This is a dummy variable equal to one if lead arrangers collaborate with at least one
unreachable new syndicate partners.
Information Pooling Needs
Information pooling
needslead arranger
This is the change in lending specialization of focal bank between the current five-year
moving window (τ) and the previous five-year moving window (τ− 1). It is calculated
as the absolute sum of the difference in the number of loans issued per sector between
τ − 1 and τ over the sum of all loans issued during both time periods:
Information pooling needsbank = ∑j
∣∣∣Number PF Loansτ,j −Number PF Loansτ−1,j∣∣∣
Number PF Loansτ−1 to τ
where Number PF Loans is the count of project finance loans arranged by each bank.
The subscript j refers to each of the ten different industry classifications a project can
be classified into, and τ refers to the five-year moving window of each bank’s lending
activity.
Information pooling
needsportfolio
Difference in the specialization between the focal bank and its lead arranger collab-
oration portfolio’s lending specialization. It is calculated as the absolute sum of the
difference between the number of loans issued by the focal bank in a specific sector
and the number of loans issued by its network of collaborations in the same sector
divided over the total number of loans issued by them altogether:
Information pooling needsportfolio =
∑
j
∣∣∣Number PF LoansBankτ−1,j −Number PF Loansportfolioτ−1,j ∣∣∣
Number PF LoansBankτ−1 + Number PF Loans
portfolio
τ−1
where the Number PF LoansBankτ−1,j refers to the number of project finance loans in in-
dustry j arranged by the focal bank in the previous time period and Number PF
Loansportfolioτ−1,j refers to the number of project finance loans in industry j arranged by
the focal bank’s portfolio of collaborations in the previous time period.
Controls
Number PF Loans Number of project finance loans arranged by the focal bank at time t. We use this as a
control because the dependent variable is the number of new syndicate partners which
increases with the number of loans the focal bank arranges.
Unless otherwise indicated, all variables are measured from t-5 through t-1.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Information Pooling
New Lead Arranger Partners 7.762 5.000 7.251 1.000 46.000
New Lead Arranger Partner Distance 0.837 0.833 0.143 0.453 1.000
Proportion of Unreachable New Partners 0.282 0.303 0 1 1677
Unreachable New Partners (Dummy) 0.671 0.47 0 1 1677
Information Pooling Needs
Information pooling needslead arranger 0.172 0.136 0.165 0.000 1.000
Information pooling needsportfolio 0.683 0.690 0.200 0.000 1.000
Controls
Number PF Loans 5.521 3.000 7.069 1.000 68.000
The unit of observation is the lead arranger collaboration portfolio level. The data set consists of 25,207
possible yearly lead arranger collaboration portfolios, for which only 1,677 are active arrangers in at
least two consecutive years between 1992 and 2014. Hence the sample contains 1,677 lead arranger
collaboration portfolio observations. For each lead arranger collaboration portfolio, we report the main
explanatory variables used in the econometric models. See Table 2 for variable definitions.
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5 Results
In order to establish the impact of information pooling needs on lead arrangers opting
to collaborate with new partner banks, we first test our two hypotheses. Subsequently,
we delve into two aspects related to both hypotheses in more detail. First, we explore
the most extreme way lead arrangers connect to new partners: by collaborating with
a lead arranger with whom there are no network connections. We refer to such lead
arranger partners as unreachable new partners because they are not in any way linked to
the lead arranger. Second, we assess whether there are scale economies in information
pooling through new partner collaborations by exploring what determines how many
of these unreachable new partners a lead arranger collaborates with when pooling
information.
5.1 Model 1: information pooling needs
We start by assessing how lead arrangers’ need to pool information when arranging
loans for projects in unfamiliar industries drives them to start new lead arranger part-
nerships. To this purpose, we use a Poisson regression to estimate equation (1) and
summarize our findings in Table 4 and Figure 3. We report these results in column (1)
of Table 4. In line with our first hypothesis, we find that lead arrangers indeed reach
out to new partners when faced with this information pooling need.
We then consider whether a lead arranger with a portfolio of collaborations already
complementing its informational capital is less inclined to start new partnerships. We
report the corresponding results in column (2) of Table 4. Again in line with our first
hypothesis, we find that lead arrangers reach out to fewer new partners when their
existing portfolio of collaborations already contains complementary information cap-
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ital. Finally, we combine both information pooling determinants and report them in
column (3) in Table 4.
For the analysis of the economic strength of both effects, we focus on the results obtained
from estimating the complete model (3), the corresponding incidence rate ratios (4),
and the impact of a one standard deviation change in a lead arranger’s information
pooling needs (5).
To interpret the positive and significant coefficient for Information poolinglead arranger
in column (3), recall that arranging loans in ‘new’ sectors means lead arrangers are
not able to leverage their existing informational capital and thus face a knowledge
gap. By pooling information through new partner banks, they may be able to narrow
this gap. Indeed, lead arrangers having to arrange project finance loans in different
sectors than those in which they have experience collaborate with 48.9% more new
partners, as the 1.489 incidence ratio5 in (4) for Information poolingbank demonstrates.
If we consider that the average lead arranger in our sample works with 7.762 new
partners, an increase of 48.9% in new collaborations translates into almost four new
partners being added to its portfolio of collaborations. Similarly, when a lead arranger
has a loan portfolio that changes by one standard deviation (or by 0.165) -in terms
of industry specialization- it will collaborate with an average of 6.8% new partners,
holding all other variables constant.
In order to understand how arranging loans in different sectors actually determines
the number of new syndicate partners, we refer to Figure 3(a). In this figure, we de-
pict the extent to which a bank arranges loans in unfamiliar sectors (horizontal axis)
and the predicted number of new syndicate partners with whom a bank collaborates
5 Incidence rate ratios are calculated by exponentiating the coefficients in (3) in Table 4, which are re-
ported in log form.
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Table 4: Information pooling through new lead arranger partners
New Lead Arranger Partners
Poisson Regression
Coefficient
estimates
Incidence
rate ratio
Incidence
rate ratio
σx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Information pooling needslead arranger 0.403∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 1.489 1.068
[0.061] [0.061]
Information pooling needsportfolio -0.280∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ 0.763 0.947
[0.065] [0.065]
Number PF Loans 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 1.034 1.038
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 1.684∗∗∗ 2.012∗∗∗ 1.935∗∗∗
[0.289] [0.295] [0.295]
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1677 1677 1677
Pseudo-R2 0.273 0.271 0.274
We estimate the relationship between pooling information needs and new partner collaborations using
a Poisson regression. Estimation results in columns (1) through (3) correspond to Poisson regressions,
where (1) concerns the effect of a lead arranger’s change in lending specialization on its pooling inform-
ation through new partnerships, (2) concerns the effect of a lead arranger’s existing pool of information
on it pooling more information through new partnerships, and (3) is the complete model. The results
presented in (4) correspond to the exponentiated coefficient obtained from estimating the full model,
that is the exponentiated values presented in (3). The results presented in (5) correspond to the ex-
ponentiated coefficients from (3) multiplied times the standard deviation of each corresponding inde-
pendent variable. The dependent variable is the number of New Lead Arranger Partners. Bank fixed
effects included in the regressions. Standard errors are shown in brackets. We use *, **, and *** to denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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(vertical axis). In line with the positive and significant estimated coefficient for In-
formation poolingbank reported in (3) in Table 4, lead arrangers collaborate with new
partners at higher rates when arranging loans in sectors new to them. Thus, enlarging
their information pools. While banks arranging loans in the same sectors (Information
poolingbank=0) have an average of 7.24 new partners, new partners increase to almost
eight when Information poolingbank is equal to 0.20, and to approximately 11 when
Information poolingbank is equal to the maximum value of one.
A second reason banks may pool information stems from the overlap in information
capital between a bank and its portfolio of collaborations. In essence, lead arrangers
holding portfolios of collaborations with different information capital have less of a
need to pool additional information through new collaborations. This effect is proxied
with the variable Information poolingportfolio. According to the negative coefficients
for Information poolingportfolio reported in (2) and (3), when a lead arranger has a port-
folio of collaborations with a complementary lending experience in terms of industry
specialization, the need to pool information decreases. The incidence ratio of 0.763 for
Information poolingportfolio reported in (4) indicates that when the overlap in informa-
tion capital between the focal bank and its portfolio of collaborations is at its highest,
the focal bank collaborates with 23.7% fewer new partners. For smaller differences,
say 10%, lead arrangers connect with 2.7% fewer new partners, ceteris paribus.6 In the
same manner, when the overlap in information capital between the focal bank and its
portfolio of collaborations changes by one standard deviation (or 20%), lead arrangers
choose to collaborate with 5.3% fewer new partners.
To gain a better understanding of how the overlap in information capital between the
focal bank and its portfolio of collaborations determines the number of new syndicate
6 This is calculated as e(β2×0.10).
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partners, we turn to Figure 3(a). In this figure, we plot the degree of specialization of
a lead arranger with respect to its portfolio of collaborations (on the horizontal axis),
and the predicted number of new syndicate partners with whom a bank collaborates
(vertical axis). The downward sloping line indicates that as the lending experience of a
lead arranger differs more from that of its portfolio of collaborations, the rate at which
it will collaborate with new partners decreases. This suggests that the need to pool
information through new partner banks decreases when the focal bank’s information
capital is complemented by that of its portfolio of collaborations. In fact, whereas a
lead arranger with a lending specialization most similar to that of its collaborators
(Information poolingportfolio=0) is expected to arrange loans with 9.5 new syndicate
partners, a lead arranger with a lending specialization that is the least similar to that
of its collaborators (Information poolingportfolio=1) is expected to arrange loans with
about 7.5 new syndicate partners. This difference in the number of new collaborations
corresponds to the decrease of 23.7% (incidence rate ratio 0.763) reported in column (4)
in Table 4.
Comparing our findings for both Information poolingbank and Information
poolingportfolio, we concluded that these results support our first hypothesis. We find
that a bank’s changing lending specialization appears to be a more important factor
determining the number of new bank collaborations. With a 10% change in its lending
specialization, the number of new partners changes by 4.89%, whereas a 10% change
in the lending of its peers results in a 2.7% change in the number of new partners.
Since the benefits of information pooling need to be balanced against the moral haz-
ard costs lead arrangers are willing to face when pooling information, we proceed by
proxying the latter with the distance to new partner banks in order to test our second
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Figure 3: Predicted number of new partners.
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(a) Predicted number of new partners per
changes in Information pooling
needslead arranger
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changes in Information pooling needsportfolio
The solid line is the predicted number of new partners the focal bank in our sample has per changes in
Information pooling needslead arranger and Information pooling needsportfolio, ceteris paribus. 95%
confidence interval bands in dark gray.
hypothesis.
5.2 Model 2: information pooling efforts
Next, we investigate the lengths at which lead arrangers are willing to go when estab-
lishing new partnerships. We estimate equation (2) using a Tobit regression, present
the results in Table 5, and illustrate them in Figure 4. The first three columns in Table 5
present the estimated coefficients for the latent new partner distance when accounting
for a lead arranger’s lending in unfamiliar industries (1), a lead arranger informational
capital in comparison to that of its portfolio of collaborations (2), and the complete
model (3). Column (4) in Table 5 presents the complete model’s marginal effects on the
observed new partner distance when all other variables are equal to zero. For inter-
32
Table 5: Information pooling through distant, new partners
New Lead Arranger Partner Distance
Tobit Regression
Latent variable
coefficients
Observed
variable ME
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information pooling needslead arranger 0.079** 0.080** 0.076**
[0.033] [0.033] [0.032]
Information pooling needsportfolio 0.054 0.056* 0.054*
[0.034] [0.034] [0.032]
Number PF Loans -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.310** 0.273* 0.258* 0.480***
[0.136] [0.140] [0.140] [0.005]
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1677 1677 1677
LR test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 841.77 838.70 844.52
We estimate the determinants of a bank’s willingness to reach out to far new partners in order to pool in-
formation using Tobit regression maximum likelihood estimates (MLE). Columns (1) through (3) present
the estimated coefficients on the latent variable new partner distance for three different estimations. The
first and second estimations concern the effect of a bank’s search for new partners when its lending spe-
cialization changes and when it pools information through its existing collaborations. The complete
model is presented in column (3). Column (4) presents the full model’s marginal effects on the observed
new partner distance when all other variables are equal to zero. The unit of observation is the bank.
The dependent variable is the New Partner Distance. Standard errors are shown in brackets. We use *,
**, and *** to denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Goodness of fit reported as
likelihood ratio chi-squared tests.
pretation purposes, we refer to the estimates reported in column (4).
In line with our second hypothesis, we find that banks reach out to more distant new
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partners when they need to pool information. First, when a bank is unable to leverage
its existing information capital because it arranges project finance loans in unfamil-
iar industries, new partners will join from more distant parts of the project finance
syndicated lending network. The positive and significant marginal effect for Informa-
tion pooling needslead arranger in (4) supports this finding. When a bank arranges loans
in completely unfamiliar industries -as opposed to arranging loans in only familiar
industries- new partner distance changes by 0.076, ceteris paribus. To put that number
into perspective, let us switch to Figure 4(a). In this figure, the x-axis shows differ-
ent values for Information pooling needslead arranger and the y-axis shows the predicted
new partner distance. A bank not needing to pool information because it only arranges
loans in industries in which it has experience (Information pooling needslead arranger=0)
collaborates with new partners who are on average 0.467 further away in the network.
This means that such a bank would search almost halfway through the length of the
project finance syndication network to search for new partners. However, a bank ar-
ranging loans in sectors where its experience is limited to non-existent (Information
pooling needslead arranger=1) collaborates with new partners who are on average 0.543
further away in the network. That is, this bank collaborates with new partners that are
more than 16% further away in the network.
A bank may also pool information when the overlap in information capital with its
existing portfolio of collaborations is high. The positive and statistically significant
coefficient for Information pooling needsportfolio in column (4) in Table 5 supports this
argument. If the information capital of a bank and its existing portfolio of collabor-
ations overlaps, the bank needs to pool information through new partners that are
farther away. This distance increases at an average rate of 0.054 as reported in Table 5.
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Figure 4: Predicted new partner distance.
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(b) Predicted new partner distance per
Information pooling needsportfolio
This figure charts the predicted distance banks are willing to search when collaborating with new
partner banks at different values of information pooling needs, ceteris paribus. The x-axis represents
changes in information pooling needs, and the y-axis represents the corresponding predicted distance
of new partner banks. 95% confidence interval bands in dark gray.
When the lead arranger has collaborators do not that complement its experience and
know-how, the need to pool information should be higher. As a result, it is expected
to collaborate with new partners that are further away. Indeed, in Figure 4(a), we
observe that lead arrangers having a portfolio of collaborators that specializes in the
same sectors form syndicates with new partners that are located further away in its
network.7
7 The network distance is 0.44 when Information pooling needsportfolio = 0 vs. a distance of 0.50 when
Information pooling needsportfolio = 1.
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5.3 Why do banks collaborate with new partners outside their exist-
ing network?
Some banks within the project finance lending network may not have any network
connections, as is the case for banks A and E in Figure 1(c). Indeed, in our sample
28.15% of all possible new partners are out of reach. From a moral hazard perspective,
these banks are expected to pose the biggest problem. Nevertheless, banks do connect
to these new, formerly ‘out of reach’ partners. Do lead arrangers accept these potential
moral hazard problems because they seek to benefit from lager information pooling
opportunities, or simply because the collection of reachable banks they can choose from
is limited?
We address this question by controlling for the number of potential partners a bank
can reach out to. After all, a bank may have to search for new partners farther away
when its existing pool of partners has been exhausted. We therefore create a variable
called % Stock of Collaborations measuring the percentage of banks within reach that
are already part of the portfolio of collaborations. When % Stock of Collaborations ap-
proaches one, a bank has exhausted the potential partners available within reach and
is more likely to reach beyond its network, similar to bank A reaching out to bank E
in Figure 1(c). To assess what determines the likelihood that this happens, we create a
dichotomous variable equal to one when a lead arranger chooses a new partner that is
classified as unreachable and zero otherwise. Table 6 contains our findings when we
explain this variable using both the need for pooling information and the % Stock of
Collaborations. Columns (1) through (3) present the log odds coefficients from estim-
ating a Logit regression, where (3) presents the results for the full model. Column (4)
contains the corresponding odds ratios for the full model in (3). To explain the direc-
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tion of the effects, we will focus on (3). To explain the economic meaning of the effects,
we will focus on (4).
We again find supporting evidence for our information pooling efforts hypothesis. Ac-
cording to the results presented in Table 6, banks are indeed more prone to collaborate
with unreachable partners when arranging project finance loans in sectors outside their
specialization. Such a need to pool information is reflected in a positive and significant
log odds for Information pooling needslead arranger. The log odds equal to 1.327 in (3)
indicate that when a lead arranger’s lending specialization changes by one or 100%,
the log odds of collaborating with unreachable new partners increase by 1.327 -or the
odds increase by 3.769, see (4). However, once we control for a lead arranger’s stock of
collaborations, the extent to which its portfolio of collaborations offer complementary
know-how is no longer a determinant for this form of information pooling.
To further investigate how different levels of Information pooling needslead arranger af-
fect the probability of a lead arranger collaborating with new partners outside its net-
work, we include Figure 5(a). In the figure, the x-axis represents different levels of In-
formation pooling needslead arranger and the y-axis represents the predicted probability
of collaborating with new partners outside the network. While the average predicted
probability of a lead arranger choosing to collaborate with unreachable new partners
is equal to 74%, the likelihood at which new partners outside the network are chosen
increases rapidly with a lead arranger’s need to pool information due to its own gap
in industry-specific know-how. When a lead arranger does not need to pool informa-
tion because it arranges loans in familiar sectors (Information pooling needslead arranger
= 0), the probability of picking new partners outside the network is 60%. As informa-
tion pooling needs increase, this probability increases, reaching 85% when Information
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Table 6: Information pooling through new partners previously outside the network
Unreachable new lead arranger
partners (dummy)
Logit Regression
Log Odds Odds Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information pooling needslead arranger 1.660∗∗∗ 1.682∗∗∗ 5.375
[0.468] [0.470] [2.527]
Information pooling needsportfolio 0.644 0.684 1.981
[0.448] [0.451] [0.894]
Number PF Loans 0.228∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 1.264
[0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.038]
% Stock of Collaborations 3.533∗∗∗ 3.687∗∗∗ 3.701∗∗∗ 40.486
[1.188] [1.206] [1.204] [48.739]
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1330 1330 1330
Pseudo-R2 0.213 0.206 0.214
LR test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 364.76 353.71 367.07
We estimate the determinants of a bank pooling information by syndicating with new partners previ-
ously outside the network using a Logit regression maximum likelihood estimates (MLE). Columns (1)
through (3) present the log odds estimates for the effect of a bank’s search for new partners previously
outside the network when its lending specialization changes (1) and when it pools information through
its existing collaborations (2). The complete model is presented in column (3). Column (4) reports the
odds ratios corresponding to the log odds coefficients reported in (3). The unit of observation is the
bank. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one when a bank collaborates with at
least one new partner previously outside the network and zero otherwise. Standard errors are shown in
brackets. We use *, **, and *** to denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Figure 5: Predicted probabilities of collaborating with new partner banks outside the
existing network.
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This figure charts the predicted probabilities of banks collaborating with new partners previously
outside the network at different values of information pooling needs, ceteris paribus. The x-axis
represents changes in information pooling needs, and the y-axis represents the corresponding
predicted probabilities. 95% confidence interval bands in dark gray.
39
pooling needsbank = 1.
These results provide further evidence that lead arrangers carefully balance the costs
and benefits of collaborating with new partner banks. In this particular case, where
new partners may be of particular concern given the expected moral hazard problems,
lead arrangers indeed only reach out if the need to pool information from the lead
arranger itself.
5.4 If, then how many?
Given that banks are willing to collaborate with new partner banks from whom a re-
ferral cannot be obtained, how many of the new collaborators are in fact outside its
existing network?
In order to find out what determines the extent to which banks are willing to pur-
sue this strategy, we estimate a series of regressions where the dependent variable is
the ratio of the number of new partners outside the network and the total number of
new partner banks. We call this variable Proportion of Unreachable New Partners.
We include our key independent variables, Information pooling needslead arranger and
Information pooling needsportfolio, two controls, Number of PF Loans and % Stock of
Collaborations, as well as bank fixed effects. Because our dependent variable ranges
between zero and one, we estimate the effect on Proportion of Unreachable New Part-
ners using both Tobit and GLM regressions. We present our results in Table 7.
The need to pool information not only pushes lead arrangers to reach further into their
network for new partners, but also increases the share of new partners that were pre-
viously outside that network, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients for
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Table 7: Information Pooling
Proportion of New Lead Arranger Partners
Previously Outside the Network
Tobit Regression GLM Regression
Latent variable
coefficients
Coefficient
estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information pooling needslead arranger 0.237∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.754∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗
[0.066] [0.066] [0.237] [0.236]
Information pooling needsportfolio 0.078 0.085 0.273 0.298
[0.068] [0.068] [0.263] [0.264]
Number PF Loans -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
% Stock of Collaborations 1.343∗∗∗ 1.338∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗∗ 5.080∗∗∗ 5.054∗∗∗ 5.123∗∗∗
[0.158] [0.159] [0.158] [0.569] [0.571] [0.574]
Constant -0.162 -0.185 -0.241 -2.668∗∗∗ -2.782∗∗∗ -2.947∗∗∗
[0.284] [0.288] [0.291] [0.651] [0.774] [0.693]
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1677 1677 1677 1677 1677 1677
LR test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 919.96 908.43 921.51
Pseudo-R2 0.348 0.344 0.349
AIC 1.186 1.188 1.187
BIC -9315.769 -9313.004 -9308.827
We estimate the determinants of a bank pooling information by arranging project finance loans with
new partners previously outside its network using Tobit and GLM regression maximum likelihood es-
timates (MLE). We present six different estimations in columns (1) through (6). Columns (1) through
(3) correspond to our Tobit regressions and columns (4) through (6) correspond to our GLM regression
estimates. The first and second estimations, reported in columns (1), (4), (2) and (5) concern the effect
of a bank’s change in lending specialization and its pooled information on it pooling more information
through collaborations with new partners outside the network, respectively. The results from estimat-
ing our complete model are reported in columns (3) and (6). The unit of observation is the bank. The
dependent variable is the ratio of the number of new partners outside the network and the total number
of new partner banks. Standard errors are shown in brackets. We use *, **, and *** to denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Figure 6: Predicted proportion of new partners previously outside the network.
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This figure charts the predicted proportion of new partners previously outside the network with whom
lead arrangers collaborate at different values of information pooling needs, ceteris paribus. The x-axis
represents changes in information pooling needs, and the y-axis represents the corresponding
predicted probabilities. 95% confidence interval bands in dark gray.
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Information pooling needslead arranger in columns (1), (3), (4) and (6). Meanwhile, the
stock of information already gathered in its network, as proxied by Information pool-
ing needsportfolio has no significant impact. Instead, lead arrangers’ willingness to reach
out to new partners outside their network increases with their lending activity (Num-
ber PF Loans) and the number of potential partner banks the lead arranger can reach
(% Stock of Collaborations). Finally, the positive and significant coefficient for the %
Stock of Collaborations confirms that, as expected, banks that already collaborate with
more banks within their reach are more likely to subsequently connect outside their
existing network.
6 Robustness tests
6.1 Robustness across sample periods
Given that our analyses include observations from a period when DealScan’s cover-
age is limited (Carey and Nini, 2007; Kleimeier and Chaudhry, 2015) as well as the
latest financial crisis period, we examine the robustness of our results to the exclusion
of these two time intervals. Hence, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using two
different samples. One sample consists of 1,564 banks arranging project finance loans
between 1997 and 2014, thus excluding the first years of ur full sample, when DealScan
coverage arguably is less complete. The second sample consists of 916 banks arranging
project finance loans between 1992 and 2007, excluding the latest financial crisis. We
exclude the latest financial crisis period because uncertainty and risk influence the rate
at which banks collaborate with each other (Hale, 2012; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004;
Minoiu and Reyes, 2013), and hence may influence our results.
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The results are presented in Table 8. Results in (1) and (3) report the Poisson regression
estimates for the Number of New Partners in years 1997-2014 and 1992-2007, respect-
ively. Results in (2) and (4) report the Tobit regression estimates for the distance of new
partners in years 1997-2014 and 1992-2007, respectively.
The estimated coefficient for Information pooling needslead arranger remains robust with
a positive and significant value throughout the two chosen sample periods for both es-
timated regressions. Notwithstanding, Information pooling needsportfolio remains a ro-
bust determinant for information pooling through new syndicate partners only when
excluding the first coverage years of DealScan (1). However, it is not an important
determinant for information pooling during periods of financial stability (2). During
such periods, lead arrangers collaborate with new partners mostly because of their
own limited informational capital. Furthermore, during periods of financial stability,
lead arrangers are more prone to also collaborate with new partners that are located
farther away in the project finance lending network (4) even if their portfolio of col-
laborations offers complementary know-how. In essence, the potential moral hazard
problems that new and distant partners pose is not a problem to lead arrangers having
an informationally-complementary portfolio of collaborations during financially stable
periods of time.
6.2 Robustness across loan arranging activity
In this second robustness analysis we address an issue that may have confounded our
results so far: if arranging more loans simply means having more new lead arrenger
partners, then our findings so far may lead us to overestimate the importance of pool-
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Table 8: Information Pooling in two sample periods: 1997-2014 and 1992-2007
New Lead Arranger Partners New Lead Arranger
Partner Distance
Poisson Regression Tobit Regression
Coefficient estimates Latent variable coefficients
1997-2014 1992-2007 1997-2014 1992-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information pooling needslead arranger 0.419*** 0.251*** 0.059* 0.1116***
[0.066] [0.082] [0.034] [0.045]
Information pooling needsportfolio -0.351*** -0.025 0.020 0.092**
[0.073] [0.087] [0.036] [0.043]
Number PF Loans 0.037*** 0.069*** 0.001 -0.000
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Constant 2.006*** 1.703*** 0.294** 0.218
[0.297] [0.300] [0.135] [0.139]
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1564 916 1564 916
Pseudo-R2 0.2898 0.3488
LR test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 4238.50 3200.46 839.01 532.49
We estimate the determinants of a bank pooling information when the bank is either highly active in ar-
ranging loans or not using Poisson and Tobit regression estimates. We present four different estimations
in columns (1) through (4). Columns (1) and (2) correspond to our Poisson regressions and columns (3)
and (4) correspond to our Tobit regression estimates. The first and third estimations, reported in columns
(1) and(3) concern the effect of information pooling in later years of our sample, and the second and
fourth estimations reported in columns (2) and (4) respectively, concern the effect of information pool-
ing in periods without financial distress. Standard errors are shown in brackets. We use *, **, and *** to
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
45
Table 9: Information Pooling across two samples of loan arranging activity: higher
than 50th percentile (High), and lower than 50th percentile (Low)
New Syndicate Partners New Partner Distance
Poisson Regression Tobit Regression
Coefficient estimates Latent variablecoefficients
High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information pooling needslead arranger 0.269∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.063
[0.089] [0.105] [0.046] [0.049]
Information pooling needsportfolio -0.367∗∗∗ -0.079 0.009 0.146∗∗∗
[0.093] [0.114] [0.046] [0.050]
Number PF Loans 0.027∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.010
[0.001] [0.023] [0.001] [0.011]
Constant 2.306∗∗∗ 1.582∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.187
[0.085] [0.309] [0.045] [0.150]
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 726 951 726 951
Pseudo-R2 0.230 0.267
LR test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 1633.87 1719.33 378.42 654.52
We estimate the determinants of a bank pooling information when the bank is either
highly active in arranging loans or not using Poisson and Tobit regression estimates.
We present four different estimations in columns (1) through (4). Columns (1) and
(2) correspond to our Poisson regressions and columns (3) and (4) correspond to our
Tobit regression estimates. The first and third estimations, reported in columns (1)
and(3) concern the effect of high loan arranging activity on information pooling, and
the second and fourth estimations reported in columns (2) and (4) respectively, con-
cern the effect low loan arranging activity on information pooling. Standard errors are
shown in brackets. We use *, **, and *** to denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels respectively.
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ing information.
We test this alternative explanation by re-estimating equations (1) and (2) using two
different samples. The first sample is composed of the 726 banks arranging more than
the 50th percentile in the number of project finance loans in our sample and the other
sample is composed of banks arranging fewer loans than the 50th percentile.8 The
results from our estimations are reported in Table 9. Results for the first sample are
reported in columns (1) and (3) and are labeled High and the results for the second
sample are reported in columns (2) and (4) and are labeled Low.
Hence, do lead arrangers arranging more loans influence the extent to which we ob-
serve more new partnerships being formed? The results presented in Table 9 in (1) and
(2) show no evidence for this claim. In essence, we find that whether the number of
project finance loans they arrange is in the above or below the median, lead arrangers
pool information through new syndicate partners when arranging project finance loans
in unfamiliar industries. The positive and significant coefficients for Information pool-
ing needslead arranger in (1) and (2), support this finding. When lead arrangers have a
collaboration portfolio offering complementary experience and know-how, they have
fewer new syndicate partners. However, while the information pooled through a lead
arrangers’ collaboration portfolio influences its decision to work with new partners,
this only matters when the lead arranger is more active in arranging project finance
loans (1).
Regarding how much moral hazard lead arrangers are willing to accept by collab-
orating with distant new partners, we find that our results remain partially robust
with the exception of lead arrangers responsible for arranger fewer than the median
8 The 50th percentile in the number of project finance loans arranged per bank in our sample is equal
to three.
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number of project finance loans (4). Under this scenario, lead arrangers seem to go
to greater lengths when searching for new partners even if their portfolio of collab-
orations already offers non-overlapping know-how. However, this does not refute the
idea that less active lead arrangers pool less information. In fact, they pool information
at higher rates.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the extent to which banks active as lead arrangers
in the project finance syndicated lending market strategically choose their new part-
ners in order to pool information, thereby lowering the overall degree of asymmetric
information between themselves and their clients. Partner selection is of particular im-
portance in a market like this with high risks and opaque borrowers, where traditional
tools to lower the (impact of) asymmetric information between borrower and leander
such as collateral and credit ratings are often of little or no use.
We find that the need to pool information explains why banks choose to collaborate in
a loan syndicate with new partners, why they reach further into their network to find
these new partners and why they even go outside their existing network if the need
to pool information is high enough. Banks active in the project finance syndicated
lending market pool information when they finance projects in new sectors and when
their existing partners’ lending portfolios are concentrated in the same sectors as their
own. Consequently, in a syndicated setting, project finance lending appears to be a
relationship market with rather complex debt structures, where banks collaborate with
the purpose of leveraging each other’s know-how when screening and monitoring.
As a result, the findings in this paper, provide an important and thus far largely miss-
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ing piece of the lending puzzle: in addition to the traditional contract design and mon-
itoring tools of banks, and complementary to relationship lending, strategic alliances
in a syndicated setting appear to provide banks with another means of dealing with
opaque, risky borrowers.
At the same time, our findings also give rise to new avenues for future research. For
example, we can also explore how market information asymmetries affect the length
of the new partnerships created in the syndicated lending market. Are banks more
inclined to sustain new partnerships for a longer time as a way to strategically mit-
igate further moral hazard problems? Finally, our data and previous research in loan
syndication show the existence of a home bias in lending when market information
asymmetries rise (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Hence,
future research should more closely examine home bias reversals through the creation
of new syndicate partnerships. Are banks more likely to partner with the more reput-
able foreign banks because they signal lower moral hazard?
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